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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1992).
V.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Has Highland City waived immunity under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-8 (1989), waiving governmental immunity for any injury
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway, road, or street, when the injury occurs on a privately
owned road in the public use containing a defective intersection
which the municipality negligently designed?
2.

If Highland City has not waived immunity under Utah

Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), has Highland City waived immunity under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989) because Highland City employees
negligently

designed the

intersection

in the scope of their

employment?
3. Did

the

Plaintiff's

injuries

negligent design of the intersection

arise

out

of the

or did the Plaintiff's

injuries arise out of the approval of the plat containing the
negligently designed intersection?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is identical for all
issues. In deciding whether judgment as a matter of law was proper,
the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial court's view of

the law. Rather, the appellate court reviews it for correctness.
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P.2d
1382 (Utah 1989) ; Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp. f
752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah
1982). In reviewing a summary judgment, the party against whom the
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts
presented,

and

all

the

inferences

fairly

arising

therefrom,

considered in a light most favorable to it. Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Garfield County. 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or
other structure located thereon.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989)1 provides:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
1

A revision of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1989) was enacted
in 1989 with an effective date of July 1, 1990. This accident
occurred on January 18, 1990. Thus, the statute in effect on the
date of the accident is provided.
2

* * *

(c) arises out of the issuance, denial,
suspension, or revocation of, or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization;
* * *

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for injuries she
suffered in an automobile collision at the intersection of 6000
West and 11500 North (the "Intersection") in Highland City on
January 18, 1990.

The Intersection was constructed in the early

1980's in connection with the development of the Oakview PUD
subdivision in Highland City, Utah County. The Plaintiff lived in
the Oakview PUD at the time of the accident.
Originally, the developer of the Oakview PUD designed
11500 North, the PUD access road, to run straight along the
northern boundary of the Oakview PUD property line, where it would
eventually intersect with 6000 West, the county road. However, the
Highland City Planning Commission refused to approve the Oakview
PUD until the developer agreed to move a portion of 11500 North to
the south such that the PUD's common area would be separated from
the residential lots. However, under this arrangement, 11500 North
intersected with 6000 West approximately 141 feet closer to the
3

crest of a hill on 6000 West. (See plat submitted by developer,
attached as Exhibit "A", and plat as approved by Highland City,
attached as Exhibit "B").

As a result, the ability of motorists

entering the Intersection from either 6000 West or 11500 North to
see other motorists was, and is, perilously limited. In fact, the
Intersection was so close to the crest of the hill on 6000 West
that it violated the safety standards for the construction of
intersections which are set forth by the American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials in their publication "A
Policy

on

Geometric

Design

of

Highways

and

Streets."

The

publication is uniformly accepted by all traffic engineers in the
State of Utah, including Defendant's experts, as the authoritative
treatise on road construction safety standards.
On January

18, 1990, the

Plaintiff

approached

the

Intersection in her vehicle. The Plaintiff looked both ways before
entering the Intersection. However, due to the limited sight
distance, Plaintiff was unable to see a vehicle being driven by
Ryan Boley because the vehicle was still climbing the hill on 6000
West. Believing it safe to enter the Intersection, the Plaintiff
attempted

to

enter

the

Intersection.

Upon

entering

the

Intersection, Plaintiff's vehicle was struck and she was rendered
a paraplegic.

4

B. Course of Proceedings,
On March 12, 1992, Highland City filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c) (1989) because it merely approved the
plat

submitted

by

the developer. R.347. Highland

City

also

contended that it owed Plaintiff no duty because 11500 North was a
private road. R.347.
In her memorandum in opposition, the Plaintiff contended
that Highland City could be held liable for her injuries because
the city waived immunity for injuries caused by the defective,
unsafe, and dangerous condition of a road, street or highway. Utah
Code Ann.

§ 63-30-8

(1989).

R.

597. Accordingly,

Plaintiff

contended that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) controlled this
litigation and that this waiver was not modified by the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (c) (1989), which Highland City
relied on in its Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 597.
The Plaintiff also argued that Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 010(1)(c) (1989), reserving governmental immunity for the negligent
approval or denial of any permit, did not apply because Highland
City rejected the plat as originally submitted and directed or
ordered the developer to move the road to the dangerous location
before his plat would be approved. R. 597. Highland City did more
than merely approve the location of the road.
5

Rather, Highland

City directed

and

designed

the location

of the road. Thus,

Plaintiff argued Highland City was liable not for approving the
plat containing the dangerous and unsafe Intersection, but for
negligently designing the Intersection in the first instance. R.
597.
C. Disposition in the Trial Court.
The trial court, by a Ruling dated June 3, 1992, granted
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (c) (1989) effectively shielded Highland City
from liability. R. 382. The Court thus held that Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-8 (1989), relating to the defective, unsafe, or dangerous
condition of highways and roads, would not apply. R. 382. The Court
also ruled that Highland City had no duty to place signs at the
Intersection or otherwise maintain the Intersection because it did
not own either road. (6000 West was a Utah County road and 11500
North, which provided access to the county road for the residents
of the Oakview PUD, was a private road).
By an Order dated August 26, 1992, the trial court
certified the summary judgment in favor of Highland City as a final
order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
R. 687. A Notice of Appeal was filed on September 8, 1992. R. 693.

6

VIII.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

The Plaintiff was involved in an automobile

accident on January 18, 1990, at the intersection of 6000 West and
11500 North (the "Intersection"), in Highland City, Utah County,
State of Utah. R. 165.
2.

As a result of the accident, Plaintiff is a

paraplegic. R. 347.
3.

11500 North provides access to the Oakview

Planned Unit Development

("PUD") . R. 486

(Deposition of Paul

Frampton, Ex. 1) . The Oakview PUD was developed in the early 1980's
and contains eight lots. R. 347.
4.

Plaintiff's family moved to the Oakview PUD in

1986. The family lived in the Oakview PUD continuously until
sometime after the accident on January 18, 1990. R. 347.
5.

Paul Frampton was the developer of the Oakview

PUD. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 5-6).
6.

In developing the Oakview PUD, Mr. Frampton

hired Richard Clayton to assist him in obtaining approval for the
subdivision from the Highland City Planning Commission. Mr. Clayton
had previously developed and obtained approval for another Planned
Unit Development located immediately to the west of the Oakview PUD

7

in Highland City. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 6-7) R.
353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 6-7).
7.

Before a developer can commence construction of

a Planned Unit Development in Highland City, the developer must
submit a proposed plat of the development to the Highland City
Planning

Commission

for

consideration

and

approval.

R.

353

(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 10).
8.

Mr. Clayton hired Nature's Estates Engineering

to prepare a plat for the Oakview PUD and to submit that plat to
the Highland City Planning Commission for consideration. R.353
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 11).
9.

After the proposed plat for the Oakview PUD had

been completed by Nature's Estates Engineering, it was submitted
to, but rejected by, the Highland City Planning Commission. R. 353
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 12) ; R. 486 (Deposition of Paul
Frampton, pp. 11-13).
10.

In the

original

plat

of

the

Oakview

PUD

prepared by Nature's Estates Engineering, 11500 North was designed
as a straight road which ran east along the northern boundary of
the Oakview PUD property line until it intersected with 6000 West.
R. 597 (Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition of
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit

8

"A" of this Brief); R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 1112); R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 12-13).
11.

Mr. Clayton and Mr. Frampton were notified by

the Highland City Planning Commission that before the City would
approve the Oakview PUD plat, Mr. Frampton would have to move part
of 11500 North to the south so that the common area in the PUD
would be separated from the lots by 11500 North. R. 486 (Deposition
of Paul Frampton, pp. 12-13) ; R. 353

(Deposition of Richard

Clayton, pp. 14-15).
12.

In accordance with the conditions set forth by

the Highland City Planning Commission, the Oakview PUD plat finally
accepted by Highland City shows that 11500 North curves to the
south and cuts through the property such that the common area is
separated from the home lots. 11500 North intersects with 6000 West
approximately 141 feet south of where it was originally planned to
intersect.

R. 597

(Exhibit "B" of Plaintifffs Memorandum in

Opposition to Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached
as Exhibit "B" to this Brief) ; R. 486

(Deposition of Paul

Frampton, pp. 11-12); R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp.
12-13).
13.

The Intersection designed by Highland City is

defective, unsafe, and dangerous because the gradient on 6000 West
as it approaches the Intersection is excessive. The Intersection is
9

also dangerous because

southbound vehicles

on 6000 West and

motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North do not have
adequate sight distance to perceive and react to each other.
Motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North cannot see
vehicles approaching the Intersection on 6000 West until the
vehicle is only 285 feet away. C. Arthur Geurts, a licensed traffic
engineer in the State of Utah, testified by affidavit as follows:
7.
Specifically, when Highland City required
the developer (Paul Frampton) to move the
Intersection from where it was proposed on the
original plat approximately 141 feet to the
south as a condition precedent to approval of
the Oakview plat, the following AASHTO design
standards were violated:
a.
Approach Gradient: For intersections like the
one positioned at 6000 West and 11500 North, AASHTO
specifies that the maximum approach gradient is 6
percent. Therefore, because Oakview Drive has an
approach gradient of at least 7 1/2 percent, the
Intersection violates AASHTO approach gradient
standards;2 and

2

"When the approach gradient of an intersection is greater
than that specified by AASHTO, the required sight distance for the
intersection must be increased because the excessive gradient
negatively effects the acceleration capabilities of vehicles
entering the Intersection and such vehicles require more time to
enter the intersection and cross the through lanes of traffic.
Based on my observations of the land 141 feet to the north of the
Intersection (where the original Oakview PUD plat proposed the
Intersection be located), if Highland City had approved the
original Oakview PUD plat as submitted by the developer (Paul
Frampton) and his engineers (Nature's Estates), there would have,
in all probability, been no violation of the AASHTO approach
gradient standards."
10

b.
Sight Distance: Based on the 85th percentile
speed of vehicles traveling on 6000 West and the
excessive approach gradients at the Intersection,
AASHTO specifies that the Intersection in question
should have a sight distance in excess of 500 feet.
Therefore, because the sight distance at the
Intersection is only 265 feet, the Intersection
violates AASHTO sight standards.
8.
Based on the results of my traffic study
and the specific violations of the AASHTO
standards enumerated above, it is my opinion
that the Intersection is defective, unsafe and
dangerous and that the specified deficiencies
were a real and proximate cause of the subject
accident.
R. 597 (Exhibit "C" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment).
14.

Officer Kerry Evans, the officer from the Utah

County Sheriff's office who investigated the accident, stated in
his Accident Report that:
The intersection at 6000 West 11500 North is a poorly
designed one in my opinion. The north bo[und] traffic
and the west bound traffic cannot see each other until
the No[orth] Bo[und] vehicle crests the hill.
The
absence of skid marks of both vehicles in this accident
shows this.
R. 597 (Exhibit "D" of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment).
15.

On January 18, 1990, the Plaintiff approached

the Intersection and stopped. R. 347. The Plaintiff looked both
ways. She then entered the Intersection. The Plaintiff was hit by
a north bound vehicle approaching the Intersection on 6000 West
11

immediately after she entered the Intersection from 11500 North in
an attempt to turn south onto 6000 West.

R. 597 (Exhibit "E" of

Plaintifffs Memorandum in Opposition to Highland City's Motion for
Summary Judgment).
16.

As a result of the accident, Plaintiff is a

paraplegic. R. 347 (Highland City's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment).
IX.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. This matter requires statutory construction. The Utah Supreme
Court

has

stated

that

"the

fundamental

consideration

in

interpreting statutes is legislative intent; and that is determined
in light of the purpose the statute was designed to achieve." Board
of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d
1030, 1033 (Utah 1983).

Applying these principles, Highland City

has waived immunity against the allegations in the Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint.
II• A. Highland City has waived immunity, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-8 (1989), from allegations that it negligently designed the
Intersection. Highland

City created

a defective, unsafe, and

dangerous condition in that motorists entering the Intersection
from

11500

North

are

unable

to

see

motorists

entering

Intersection on 6000 West in time to avoid a collision.
12

the

It is beyond dispute that a person may maintain an action
against a governmental entity for injuries which are proximately
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of a public
road. Biaelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v.
State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State Road Commission.
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). However, 11500 North is a private road
which is in the public use. The issue is whether there is any
distinction in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) between governmental
negligence in relation to a public road and negligence in relation
to a private road.
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the purpose of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), as reflected in the statute's plain
language, is to provide relief to all motorists for governmental
negligence in relation to roads and streets, without respect to
whether the road is publicly owned or privately owned but in the
public use. Plaintiff asserts that no distinction between public
and private roads should be made absent a showing by Highland City
that such was the intent of the Legislature.
The definition of "highway" in the Motor Vehicle Act
supports this conclusion. "Highway" is defined as any place which
"is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for
vehicular

traffic."

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

41-2-102

(1988).

The

definition of "highway" does not focus on the ownership of the
13

road, but instead focuses on whether the street is open to public
use. The purpose of this broad definition of "highway" seems to be
to protect all motorists, whether using a public or private
roadway. 11500 North is open to public use. There is no reason to
believe that the Legislature intended to expose those using private
roads to governmental negligence while offering relief to those
injured on negligently designed private roads.
II.B. If Highland City has waived immunity under the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), then the city may not recover that
immunity if an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989)
also applies. Instead, where both the exception and Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-8 (1989) apply, the governmental entity is deemed to have
waived immunity. Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745
(Utah 1971); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R., 749 P.2d
660, 667 n.6 (Utah App. 1988); Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah,
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). The trial court erred by failing
to consider whether Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) applied after
it determined that an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-10(1)
(1989) also applied.
III. Highland City has waived immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 6330-10(1) (1989), which provides that governmental entities have
waived immunity for all negligent acts committed by their employees
within the scope of employment. Here, the Plaintiff has alleged
14

that Highland City employees negligently designed the Intersection
while

in the scope of their employment. The Plaintiff also

presented unchallenged evidence demonstrating that Highland City
designed the Intersection in a defective, unsafe, and dangerous
manner. Thus, Highland

City has waived

immunity

against the

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint.
IV. The trial court ruled that Highland City had retained immunity
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c) (1989), providing immunity
for the negligent issuance of a permit, because Highland City
merely approved the subdivision plat. This was error because in
order for this provision to apply, the Plaintiff's injuries must
"arise out of" the approval

of the plat map. However, the

Plaintiff's injuries here did not arise out of Highland City's
negligent approval of the plat map, but arose out of Highland
City's negligent design of the Intersection.
Plaintiff asserts that Highland

City

should not be

allowed to absolve itself and its employees of liability for their
negligence by the issuance of a self-serving approval or permit.
Instead, in accordance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
Highland City should be held accountable for the negligent acts of
its employees committed within the scope of their employment.
Highland City has unfairly characterized Plaintiff's
claims in order to retain immunity. The Utah Supreme Court has
15

indicated that municipalities should not be allowed to characterize
the facts in such a manner that the case is pigeon holed into a
category of activity for which immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt
Lake City. 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) ("the city may not rely on
section 63-30-10(1) (d) of the Act to torture the facts of this case
into the provisions of that section."). Plaintiff respectfully
asserts that whether immunity exists should be based on the
allegations

in

the

Second

Amended

Complaint

and

the

facts

established at trial and should not be based on Highland City's
self-serving characterizations of the Plaintiff's claim.
V. The trial court ruled that Highland City's activities with
respect

to

the

Intersection

were

normal

activities

of

a

municipality with respect to a subdivision, and therefore immunity
should attach. However, no authority was given for this conclusion.
The contention is contrary to the legislative purpose of the Utah
Governmental

Immunity

Act.

The

Legislature

expressly

waived

immunity for the negligent acts of employees. The Legislature also
waived immunity for governmental negligence in relation to both
public and private roads. Thus, while Highland City's activities
may have been normal, this does not, and should not, lead to the
conclusion that the city is immune for negligently carrying out the
activities. This is particularly true when there is no dispute that
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had Highland City engaged in these activities in relation to a
public road, immunity would have been waived.
X.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
OVERVIEW
The

fundamental

issue

in this case

is:

Should a

municipality have the authority to alter the plat design created by
an engineer without using reasonable care to ensure that the
changes to the plat are safe? The Oakview PUD plat was engineered
by

Nature's

Estates

Engineering,

an

experienced

subdivision

planner. The Intersection was located such that there was adequate
sight distance for motorists of both 6000 West and 11500 North. Had
Highland City approved the plat as engineered, the accident would
likely not have occurred.
But

Highland

City

altered

the

Nature's

Estates

Engineering plan. The City, without re-engineering the Intersection
to ensure that The City's plan was safe, required the developer to
move the Intersection closer to the crest of the hill, causing the
perilous sight distance problem. The issues are thus posed:

What

are the limits of a municipality's power to condition subdivision
approval? Must the municipality use reasonable care to ensure that
any conditions or alterations to the subdivision plat are safe?
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Must the municipality either rely on the developer's engineering
plan or, if it chooses to alter these plans, use reasonable care to
ensure that the access road from the subdivision to the county road
is safe?
In order to appreciate the nature of this case, an
analogy is in order using Loveland v. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763
(Utah 1987). In Loveland, the developer failed to fence a canal.
The City approved the plat without requiring the canal to be
fenced.

After the plaintiffs1 son drowned in the canal, the

plaintiffs sued Orem City for failure to require the canal to be
fenced. The Utah Supreme Court correctly held that Orem City could
not be sued because it simply approved the plat plan submitted and
relied upon the engineering of the developer to ensure that the
development covered by the plat was safe.
But assume a different set of facts. Assume that the
developer, after extensive engineering, submitted a plat with the
canal fenced. Assume further that the Orem City Council, without
using due care to ensure that the canal would still be safe, would
not approve the plat with the canal fenced because it wanted access
to the canal.

Orem

City would

then

have

replaced

a safe

improvement with an unsafe improvement. Orem City also would fail
to apply the standard of reasonable care which would be required if
the canal was publicly owned.
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A similar situation happened here in the case at bar.
Highland City altered the safe and engineered location of the
Intersection and moved the Intersection, without using reasonable
care, to an unsafe location.

Highland city failed to meet the

standard of care which would be required if 11500 North was a
public road.

11500 North was the access road which the public

would use to access 6000 West, the county road.
This entire case focuses on whether a municipality should
have the power to place subdivision residents at peril without
using due care to ensure that the municipality!s subdivision plans
are safe. Plaintiff's approach is simply this. If the municipality
wishes to rely upon the developer's plans and engineering to assume
that reasonable care was used in designing the subdivision, then no
liability

should

attach

to

the

municipality.

But

if

the

municipality chooses to disregard the developer's engineering and
replace it with its own plans, then it must use due care in doing
so. This is consistent with the this Court's recent decision in
Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah App. 1992), where
the Court stated:
Rather than placing a duty on a municipality
to erect traffic control devices, the common
law requires only that once the municipality
takes action to install such devices, it must
do so in a non-negligent manner.
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Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not seek to alter the
power of municipalities with respect to subdivisions. Plaintiff
only asks that the municipality either rely on the engineering of
the developer, or use due care in redesigning the plat. Highland
City did neither here. Plaintiff only asks that Highland City use
the same reasonable care in redesigning subdivision plats and roads
contained therein which the law requires that it must use in
designing public roads and improvements.
The

arguments

below

focus

on

legal

reasoning

and

statutory interpretation. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this
Court view these arguments in light of the above policy arguments.
A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This matter requires statutory interpretation. The issue
is whether Highland City has retained immunity from suit against
allegations that employees of Highland City negligently designed
the Intersection in an inherently defective, unsafe, and dangerous
manner.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the

"primary

responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature." American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689
P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984); West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446
(Utah 1982) . The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that "the
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fundamental consideration in interpreting statutes is legislative
intent; and that is determined in light of the purpose the statute
was designed to achieve." Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v.
Salt Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983).
The Plaintiff respectfully asserts that applying these
standards, Highland City has waived immunity for the negligent
design of the Intersection.
B.
HIGHLAND
CITY
HAS
WAIVED
IMMUNITY
FOR
DEFECTIVE, UNSAFE. AND DANGEROUS CONDITIONS IN
ROADS AND STREETS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN, § 6330-8 (1989),
1. UTAH CODE ANN, S 63-30-8 (1989) APPLIES WHERE THE GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITY NEGLIGENTLY DESIGNS A PRIVATELY OWNED ROAD WITHIN THE PUBLIC
USE,
Highland City has waived immunity, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.

§

designed

63-30-8
the

(1989) , from

allegations

Intersection. Highland

that

City created

it

negligently

a defective,

unsafe, and dangerous condition in that motorists entering the
Intersection from 11500 North are unable to see motorists entering
the Intersection on 6000 West in time to avoid a collision. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) provides:
Immunity
from
suit of all
governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or
other structure located thereon.
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Id. The trial

court, without discussing

the merits of this

provision, held that it would not be applicable because Highland
City had retained immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10(1)(C) (1989).
As demonstrated below, there can be little doubt that
Highland City has waived immunity when its negligent acts create a
defective, unsafe, and dangerous condition in a public highway or
road. However, 11500 North is a private road owned and maintained
by the Oakview PUD, although 11500 North is within the public use.
There is no Utah authority on the issue of whether Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-8 (1989) applies to negligent governmental acts in relation
to private roads in the public use. Thus, the goal is to determine
the legislative intent, which is to be evaluated in light of the
purpose of the statute. Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v.
Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983).
It is beyond dispute that a person may maintain an action
against a governmental entity for injuries which are proximately
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of a public
road. Bigelow v. Incrersoll, 618 P. 2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v.
State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State Road Commission,
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). In Bigelow, the plaintiffs alleged that
the state negligently designed the traffic control lights at an
intersection, causing both lights at the intersection to be green
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at the same time. The Utah Supreme Court held that the design and
installation of traffic control devices was not a "discretionary
function" for which immunity had been retained. Id. at 53. Instead,
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) applied and,
therefore, the state was not immune from suit. Id. at 53-54.
In Andrus v. State. 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court found that the "State created a dangerous condition
by its design of the highway project" and that the conduct was
within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9 (1989), waiving
immunity for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous
condition in any public building or structure. Id. at 1120. The
Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's contention that its design
was a discretionary function, holding that "the preparing of plans
and specifications and the supervision of the manner in which the
work was carried out cannot be labeled discretionary functions."
Id. Once again, the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed against the
governmental entity.
Finally, in Carroll v. State Road Commission. 496 P. 2d
888 (Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that the creation of
a highway design which used "berms" instead of signs to protect
motorists was not a discretionary function. Id. at 891. Instead,
the Court held that the State was not immune from suit for its
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negligent design of the highway and the plaintiffs could bring
suit. Id.
These cases demonstrate that had 11500 North been a
public roadway, Highland City would not have immunity under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) against allegations
that it negligently designed the Intersection. The Legislature's
clearly expressed intent was to waive immunity for any defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition caused by government in the design
and maintenance of highways and roads. The issue becomes whether
Highland City has also waived

immunity when the governmental

conduct occurred in relation to a private road in the public use.
Put another way, is there any basis for distinguishing between the
negligent design of a public road as opposed to the negligent
design of a private road within the public use for purposes of
immunity. Plaintiff respectfully asserts the legislative intent
would not allow for such a distinction.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the legislative
intent is the plain language of the statute itself. The statute
applies to "any highway, road, [or] street", without distinguishing
between public roads and privately owned roads in the public use.
The broad language of the statute suggests that the Legislature
intended to waive immunity for all governmental involvement in
relation to highways, roads, and streets. The statute indicates
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that anytime a governmental entity becomes involved in the design,
construction, or maintenance of any highway, road, or street, the
entity

has

waived

immunity

from

allegations

of

negligence

regardless of whether the highway, road, or street was publicly
owned or privately owned but in the public use.
It is well accepted that in construing statutes, the
Court must assume that each term of the statute was used advisedly.
For example, in Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake
City, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
This Court assumes that the terms of a statute
are used advisedly and should be given an
interpretation and application which is in
accord with their usually accepted meanings.
Id. See Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah
1971)("Foundational rules require that we assumed that each term of
the statute was used advisedly.11).
Applying this principle, this Court should assume that
the Legislature intended no distinction between injuries occurring
on a public road and those occurring on a privately owned road in
the public use. No such distinction should be created absent a
showing by Highland City that the Legislature intended to allow
governmental entities to negligently design privately owned roads
without being subject to liability.
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Highland City will no doubt argue that the Legislature
intended the statute to apply to roads which the government
controlled and maintained. However, the purpose behind Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) is to provide relief to those who have been
injured on a road or street due to the negligence of government in
the design or maintenance of the roads. If the Legislature failed
to waive immunity, motorists would have no remedy for a defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition on a road because government is
responsible for maintaining and designing the roads. There is no
one else to provide relief when the government negligently designs
a road because only the government was negligent.
The same situation is present here. The developer will
argue that Highland City designed the Intersection and, therefore,
he cannot be held liable. Highland City argues that it is immune
and,

therefore,

cannot

be

held

liable

for

designing

the

Intersection. Thus, the Plaintiff is left without a remedy, even
though the Legislature has expressly waived immunity in order to
insure that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy for their injuries.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the purpose of the statute was
to hold governmental entities liable for their negligent acts in
relation to roads and streets, without respect to whether or not
the road was publicly owned or privately owned but in the public
use.
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There is additional support for this contention in the
definition of "highway" in the Motor Vehicle Act.

(The term

"highway" is not defined in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.)
"Highway" is defined in the Motor Vehicle Act as follows:
(8) "Highway" means the entire width between
property lines of every way or place of any
nature when any part of it is open to the use
of the public, as a matter of right, for
vehicular traffic.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102 (1988). The same definition is provided
in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-1(14)(1988). This definition of "highway"
is broad, encompassing both public and private roads, and indeed
covers any "way" open for use by the public. The definition of
"highway" does not focus upon ownership of the road, but instead
focuses on whether or not the public will use the highway. While
the Oakview PUD retains responsibility for maintenance of 11500
North, the street is accessible by anyone and is, therefore, "open
to the use of the public".
The broad definition of "highway" contained in the Motor
Vehicle Act is apparently designed to protect users of all highways
open to public use, whether or not these highways are publicly or
privately owned. Under this definition of "highway", one could be
held liable for traffic violations, such as speeding or running a
stop sign, on both 6000 West, a public road, and 11500 North, a
private road within the public use. With its broad definition of
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"highway", the legislature subjected both public and private roads
to the same safety regulations in order to protect the users of
these streets and highways. Indeed, in many instances, such as the
present one, there is no way to determine without a visit to the
county building whether one is travelling on a publicly owned road,
for which recovery can be had against the government for its
negligence, or a privately owned road used by the public, for which
Highland City argues no recovery for governmental negligence can be
obtained.
There is no reason to believe that the Legislature, in
enacting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), intended to depart from
its purpose of protecting all users of both public and private
highways from governmental negligence. There is also no evidence
that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy for only those
users injured while operating motor vehicles on a public highway,
even where the governmental entity negligently designed the private
highway within the public use.

Instead, the more reasonable

interpretation is that the Legislature intended to protect all
motorists using highways in the state from governmental negligence,
without respect to whether or not these "highways" are public or
privately owned, and intended to provide the same remedy for
governmental negligence whether the negligence occurred in relation
to a public or private road.
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In sum, there is nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-8
(1989)

which

suggests

that

immunity

is

retained

when

the

governmental entity acts negligently with respect to a privately
owned road in the public use. The broad wording of the statute and
the apparent purpose of the statute both suggest that the remedy
should be the same regardless of whether the government negligently
designs a public road or a private road in the public use. In both
instances, the negligent act is the same, the injuries are the
same, and the public sought to be protected is the same. Only the
name on the title differs.
Thus, the Plaintiff respectfully submits that because the
statute makes no distinction between public and private roads, this
Court should not create one absent a showing by Highland City that
the Legislature intended to shield governmental entities from their
negligence simply because the title to the road was privately held.
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1)(O
ANN. § 63-30-8 (1989).

(1989) IS SUBJECT TO UTAH CODE

The trial court ruled that Highland City had retained
immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c)
(1989), and therefore refused to consider whether Highland City had
waived immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8
(1989) . This ruling proceeds from the assumption that Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10 (c) (1) (1989) is not subject to Utah Code Ann. § 6330-8 (1989) . But Utah law consistently holds that if both Utah Code
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Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) and an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(1) (1989) apply, the governmental entity is held to have waived
immunity.
For example, in Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d
741 (Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme Court held that:
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 and 9
encompasses a much broader field of tort
liability that merely negligent conduct of
employees
within
the
scope
of
their
employment, the legislature could not have
intended
than
Sec.
10, including
its
exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 and 9, even
though it be conceded that the negligent
conduct of an employee might be involved in an
action for injuries caused by the creation or
maintenance of a dangerous or defective
condition.
Id. at 745 (emphasis added) .
In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. , 749 P.2d 660
(Utah App. 1988), this Court noted that:
In his cross-appeal, Gleave did not challenge
the trial court's dismissal of UDOT. Rio
Grande, in both its opposition to UDOT's pretrial motion to dismiss and in its appeal to
this court, has not contended that Gleave's
injury was caused by UDOT's creation of a
dangerous condition on a road, for which
immunity is expressly waived in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-8
(1986). This separate waiver
provision is not subject to the "discretionary
function" exception in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 010(1). [citations omitted].
Id. at 667 n.6 (emphasis added) . See also Provo City Corp. v. State
of Utah, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990).
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Thus, Utah law in this area is clear. If Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-8 (1989) applies to this matter, then Highland City has
waived immunity, even if it is found that Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(1)(c) (1989) also applies.
C.
HIGHLAND CITY HAS WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR THE
NEGLIGENT DESIGN OF THE INTERSECTION UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1) (1989).
Even if Highland City did not waive immunity under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), it has waived immunity against the
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint under the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989), which provides:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
* * *

Id.
Plaintiff has alleged that Highland

City employees,

acting within the scope of their employment, negligently designed
the

Intersection,

dangerous

thereby

condition

which

creating
was

the

a defective, unsafe, and
proximate

cause

of

the

Plaintiff's injuries. As such, Highland City has waived immunity
from suit.
The trial court did not consider this provision because
it found that an exception to this provision, Utah Code Ann. § 6331

30-10(1)(c) (1989), applied and therefore Highland City retained
immunity. However, as detailed in Section IV of this Appellant's
Brief immediately below, the exception is not applicable because
the injuries did not "arise out of" the approval of the subdivision
plat, but instead arose out of the negligent design of the
Intersection by Highland City. In fact, none of the exceptions to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989) apply in this matter. Highland
City has, therefore, waived immunity against the allegations in the
Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
summary judgment entered in favor of Highland City be reversed.
D.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (1) (O (1989) DOES
NOT APPLY TO SHIELD HIGHLAND CITY FROM
LIABILITY BECAUSE THE INJURY DID NOT ARISE OUT
OF THE APPROVAL OF THE SUBDIVISION PLAT.
The trial court ruled that Highland City had retained
immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c)
(1989), which provides:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
* * *

(c) arises out of the issuance, denial,
suspension, or revocation of, or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke, and permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization.
32

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c)(1989).
In order for the trial court to make this ruling, the
court had to find that the Plaintiff's injuries "arose out of" the
approval of the subdivision plat. Id. The trial court erred in its
ruling because there was no evidence to this effect. Instead, all
evidence leads to the conclusion that the proximate cause of the
Plaintiff's injuries was Highland City's negligent design of the
Intersection. The allegations in the Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint support this contention:
21. City of Highland had a duty to design,
construct, sign and maintain the intersection
in a manner which would provide individuals
approaching or entering the intersection with
a reasonable opportunity to see approaching
traffic and act accordingly.
23. The intersection was negligently designed,
constructed, signed, and/or maintained by City
of Highland and its employees, agents or
contractors because motorists approaching the
intersection from the South and East do not
have a reasonable opportunity to either see
each other as they approach and enter the
intersection or take necessary evasive action.
R. 165

(Second Amended Complaint, f 21, 23) (emphasis added).

Additionally,
establishing

the
that

Plaintiff
Highland

presented
City

credible

negligently

evidence

designed

the

Intersection. The developer of the Oakview PUD, Paul Frampton,
testified that Highland City "didn't want the common area to be
contiguous with any of the lots. They wanted it separate from the
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lots, so that it would be an entity in and of itself." R. 486
(Deposition

of

Paul

Frampton, p.

13). Richard

Clayton, who

submitted the original plat, testified that Highland City "is the
one that designed the common area. And as I recall, they made that
a stipulation before the approval of the subdivision." R. 353
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 15).
Plaintiff is not attempting to hold Highland City liable
for merely approving the subdivision plat without removing the
dangerous Intersection. Rather, Plaintiff is attempting to hold
Highland City liable for negligently designing the Intersection and
requiring that 11500 North be positioned in such a manner that the
Intersection is defective, unsafe, and dangerous.
The crux of Highland City's argument seems to be that so
long as the final act of government is the approval of the plat
map, all negligent acts of employees committed within the scope of
their employment are not actionable because immunity is retained.
In other words, once the permit is issued or approval is given, all
employees are absolved of their negligence and injured victims are
left

without

a

remedy.

Under

Highland

City's

argument,

municipalities are free to act negligently and are then allowed to
absolve themselves of liability by issuance of a self-serving
approval or permit.
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Granting Highland City immunity does not reflect the
purpose of the Legislature in enacting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)
(1989). The Utah Legislature expressly provided that negligent acts
committed by governmental employee within the scope of their
employment are actionable if they are the proximate cause of the
accident. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989). The Legislature
intended to provide relief for individuals injured by the negligent
acts of governmental employees. By allowing municipalities to
circumvent this intended purpose by issuance of a self-serving
permit or approval, this purpose is defeated. Municipalities can
shield themselves from providing that which the Legislature has
given—relief

to

individuals

injured

by

negligent

acts

of

governmental employees.
Before

the

trial

court,

Highland

City

unfairly

characterized the Plaintiff's contentions in order to pigeon hole
the Plaintiff's claim into a category of activity

for which

immunity has been retained. Plaintiff respectfully asserts that
whether governmental

immunity exists should be based

on the

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and evidence which is
adduced at trial, not on the self-serving characterizations of
Highland City.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that municipalities
should not be allowed to characterize the facts in such a manner
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that the case is pigeon holed into a category of activity for which
immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P. 2d 126 (Utah
1987). In Ingram, plaintiff fell through a defective water meter
lid. Plaintiff alleged that Salt Lake City negligently designed the
placement of the water meter lid, for which there was no immunity.
Salt Lake City argued that its true failing was to inspect the
water meter lid after it had been installed, for which immunity had
been retained. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (d) (1989) . The Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Salt Lake City attempts to distinguish Murray
and Bowen on the grounds that in the former,
the plaintiff fell into a hole on the sidewalk
and in the latter, the city's maintenance of a
city street was at issue, whereas here the
vault was not located on a public street. Both
status and case law hold otherwise, and the
city may not rely on section 63-30-10(1) (d) of
the Act to torture the facts of this case into
the provisions of that section.
Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
Like Ingram. Highland City here argues that its true
failing was to negligently approve the subdivision plat, even
though there is no evidence that this failing proximately caused
the Plaintiff's injuries. Highland City seeks to avoid the issue of
whether it negligently designed the Intersection by torturing the
facts

in order to retain

immunity

exceptions.
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under

one of the waiver

Absolutely all the evidence in this case indicates that
the Plaintiff's injuries "arose out of" the negligent design of the
Intersection. Thus, there is no provision under which Highland City
has retained

immunity, and the summary judgment in favor of

Highland City should be reversed.
Before the trial court, Highland

City placed great

reliance upon Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P. 2d 763 (Utah
1987). For this reason, Plaintiff discusses Loveland in her brief.
In Loveland, the Orem

City

Council approved

a plat without

requiring the developer to fence a canal running behind the
subdivision. The

plaintiffs1

son drowned

in the

canal. The

plaintiffs claimed that Orem City was negligent in the "review and
approval of the plat by the Orem City Council." Id. at 775. The
Orem City Council did not alter the developer's plans with respect
to the plat. Instead, the Orem City Council relied upon the
developer to insure that the subdivision was safe and properly
designed.
Here, Highland City went well beyond mere "review and
approval" of a plat designed by others. Highland City did not rely
upon the developer to insure that the subdivision was safe.
Instead, Highland City designed the Intersection and, therefore,
accepted the duty to design the Intersection in a reasonable
manner. The Utah Supreme Court has recently stated the general rule
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as once a municipality undertakes a duty to design or maintain a
road, it must exercise due care. Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P. 2d
554 (Utah 1992). In Jones, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Rather than placing a duty on a municipality
to erect traffic control devices, the common
law requires only that once the municipality
takes action to install such devices, it must
do so in a non-negligent manner.
Id. at 560 (emphasis added). The difference between Loveland and
the instant case is that in Loveland, the Orem City Council did not
accept this duty because it merely approved the developer's plans.
Here, Highland City chose to design the Intersection rather than
rely upon the developer.
Thus, Loveland and the instant case are qualitatively
different.

In Loveland, all the claims related to the "review and

approval of plat B of Executive Estates." Loveland, 746 P. 2d at
775. Here, any claims regarding the approval of the plat are
distinct from the primary allegation that Highland City negligently
designed the Intersection. Thus, Loveland does not control this
matter.
Highland City also relied upon Bennett v. Bow Valley
Development Corp.. 797 P. 2d 419 (Utah 1990), before the trial
court.

Like

Loveland,

the

Plaintiff's

in

Bow

attacked

"the

inspection and acceptance of subdivision improvements which were
never completed." Id. at 423. In Bow, there was no contention that
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the City was negligent apart from the approval of the subdivision
plat.
In both Loveland and Bow, the plaintiff was attempting to
hold the municipality liable for failing to prevent the negligence
of third parties. In neither case was the municipality the party
that had acted negligently. Plaintiff has no quarrel with either
Loveland or Bow, or the notion that a municipality cannot be held
liable simply because it fails to "catch" the negligence of third
parties. But Plaintiff does quarrel with the notion that the
principles stated in Loveland and Bow would shield a municipality
from the negligence of its own employees where no third party is
involved.
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-10(1) (1989) focuses on what the injury "arises out of".
Here, there can be little dispute that the injury arose out of the
design of the Intersection, not the approval of the subdivision
plat. Here, there is no dispute that no one other than Highland
City designed the intersection. As such, Highland City has waived
immunity for it negligent design of the Intersection.
E.
HIGHLAND CITY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ACT
NEGLIGENTLY WITH RESPECT TO SUBDIVISION
DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
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In the closing paragraph of the trial court's ruling, the
court held:
Furthermore,
Utah
case
law
supports
defendant's position that the granting of
immunity in this case is consistent with the
need for a municipal government to participate
in and have a say in development, without
incurring liability therefrom.
R. 382. This statement was made without supporting authority, and
is contrary to the principles of governmental immunity in this
state.
As outlined above, there can be no doubt the Legislature
waived immunity for the negligent design of a public intersection.
The Legislature apparently intended to provide relief to those
injured by a governmental entity's negligent design. This leads the
Plaintiff to ask: Why would the Legislature waive immunity for the
negligent design of a road or street, but then except from that
waiver the negligent design of a subdivision intersection?
would

the

negligently
provide

Legislature

allow

municipalities

the

Why

freedom

to

design roads in private subdivisions which would

access

municipalities
accountability?

to
to

public

roads

negligently

when

design

it

would

public

not

roads

allow
without

Highland City attempts to create a distinction

between public intersections and private intersections, but there
is no rational basis for making such a distinction. To create such
a

distinction destroys the purpose
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of the Utah

Governmental

Immunity Act, which is to provide relief to those injured by the
negligent acts of government.
Perhaps
contention

that

there

is

some merit

municipalities

must

to

the

have

trial

some

court's

freedom

to

participate in subdivision design. But that freedom should be
subject to the same conditions as are imposed when government
participates in other activities, such as the design of a public
road. Just as the State waives immunity once its decides to design
a public highway or road, it should be held that Highland City has
waived immunity when it chooses to participate in the subdivision
design. This contention has particular merit since Highland City
was under no duty to participate in the design of the Intersection.
In sum, Highland City should be held accountable for its
actions. Without any legal requirement to do so, Highland City
chose to design this Intersection. Therefore, it accepted the duty
to design the Intersection in a safe manner. Jones v. Bountiful
City, 834 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah App. 1992). Highland City failed in
this endeavor. Thus, it should be required to pay the price for its
negligence.
XI.
CONCLUSION
Highland

City

has

waived

immunity

for

creating

a

defective, unsafe, and dangerous Intersection. Utah Code Ann. § 6330-8

(1989) . However, even if this provision does not apply,

Highland City has still waived immunity because its employees
41

negligently designed the Intersection while acting in the scope of
their

employment.

Utah

Code Ann.

§

63-30-10(1)

(1989).

The

exception to this waiver contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 010(1) (c) (1989) does not apply because the approval of the plat was
not the proximate cause of the injury. Instead, the injury was
proximately caused by Highland City's negligent design. On the
basis of the foregoing, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of Highland City, and remand these proceedings to the trial
court for a trial on the merits.
DATED this A £

day of January, 1993.
MORGAN & HANSEN

Stephen G. Morgan
Randall D. Lund
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

on

the

day

of

January, 1993, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be mailed, first class to the following:
Gary B. Ferguson
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Highland City
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Lee C. Henning
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Utah County
510 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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